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I. INTRODUCTION
Liskula Cohen is a Canadian-born model that is currently living in New
York.' Until recently, she was best known for modeling for Australian Vogue,
Armani, Versace, Elle, and Cleo.2 She will now be known as the "Skankiest in
NYC." Why? Because a blog entitled "Skanks in NYC" dubbed her this.4 The
blog also stated that Liskula was a "psychotic, lying, whoring . .. skank" and "a
desperate 'fortysomething' who was past her prime."5 Liskula sought redress for
these remarks by filing a defamation suit in state court.6 Because the blog's au-
thor was anonymous, she filed a motion to seek the identity of the blogger, serv-
ing this motion upon Google, the owner of the website.7 As a policy matter,
Google would not reveal the identity of the blogger without a court order.8 A
Manhattan trial judge, Joan Madden, eventually ordered Google to turn over all
"information that would assist in ascertaining the identity of [the blogger]." 9
As a result of this court order, Google turned over the relevant informa-
tion, revealing that Fashion Institute of Technology student Rosemary Port was
the author of the "Skanks in NYC" blog.'o After having her identity revealed,
Port has expressed that she is not satisfied at all with the representation that
Google gave her during its opposition to Liskula's motion." She stated:
When I was being defended by attorneys for Google, I thought
my right to privacy was being protected.. . . But that right fell
through the cracks. Without any warning, I was put on a silver
platter for the press to attack me. I would think that a multi-
David Wylie, Model wins suit against Google, CANADA.COM, August 20, 2009,
http://www2.canada.com/state+security+building+torched+cairo+report/4390121/story.html?id=1
912179.
2 Liskula Cohen Profile, FASHION MODEL DIRECTORY.COM,
http://www.fashionmodeldirectory.com/models/liskulacohen/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
3 Kim Zetter, 'Skanks' Blogger Unmasked by Google Vows to Sue Company, WIRED (Aug.
24, 2009, 1:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/blogger-unmasked/.
4 Id.
Id.
6 Wendy Davis, Model: 'I am not a Skank,' MEDIAPOST, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art-aid=97848.
7 Zetter, supra note 3.
s Davis, supra note 6.
9 Order Granting Cohen Petition to Compel Disclosure at n.1, Cohen v. Google, Inc., No.
100012/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.cyberslapp.org/documents/OrderGrantCohenPet.pdf
10 George Rush, Outed Blogger Rosemary Port Blames Model Liskula Cohen for 'Skank'
Stink, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/gossip/2009/08/23/2009-
08-23_outted blogger rosemaryjport blames model liskulacohen forskank stink.html.
I Id.
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billion dollar conglomerate would protect the rights of all its us-
ers.12
As a result, Port then discussed the idea of filing suit against Google,
the blog site owner. Her attorney, Salvatore Strazzullo, explained that Port's
suit would allege that Google "breached its fiduciary duty to protect her expec-
tation of anonymity."l 3 This allegation gives rise to an interesting question:
Does Google, or for that matter any website, owe a fiduciary duty to its users?
The purpose of this Note is to address the question whether a blog site
owes a fiduciary duty to its users that requires it to aggressively oppose any
motion seeking to release that user's confidential information. In the back-
ground section, this Note first examines a bloggers' expectation of privacy;
more specifically, it examines how the United States Constitution protects ano-
nymous speech and the extent to which this protection has expanded into the
realm of cyberspace. This section also examines the three primary tests courts
use to evaluate whether a website owner should "unmask" an anonymous blog-
ger. The background section next examines the duty that Online Service Pro-
viders1 4 ("OSPs") have in protecting the rights of its users by evaluating the
questions whether OSPs have standing to protect these users' privacy rights and
whether an OSP must provide notification to the user of a subpoena request.
The background section then briefly examines any potential liability an OSP
may have for third-party content before, finally, examining the types of re-
course, if any, an anonymous blogger has outside of breach of fiduciary duty
allegations when he or she has been unmasked.
In its analysis section, this Note examines the arguments for and against
a finding that an OSP has a fiduciary duty to its blogger users. This section be-
gins with an update to current anonymous blogger litigation. This section then
reviews what Google did to protect the anonymity of the blogger in the "Skanks
in NYC" case. The analysis section proceeds to briefly discuss the legal prin-
ciples surrounding fiduciary duty and agency relationships. This section then
discusses the arguments for and against the formation of a fiduciary relationship
between a user and an OSP. Finally, the analysis section gives two recommen-
dations for what OSPs can do to protect against the formation of a fiduciary
relationship between itself and a user.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Online Service Providers ("OSPs") refer to any provider of Internet service, including a
social networking site, a company running a blog, etc. This is broader than an Internet Service
Provider, which is merely a company providing access to the Internet. See KENT D. STUcKEY,
INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 2.03 (2010).
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II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing whether a fiduciary duty exists between an OSP and a
user, it is important to understand some of the basic constitutional parameters
surrounding anonymous blogging in cyberspace and the procedural and legal
aspects to seeking a court order to reveal the identity of an anonymous blogger.
As such, the background section discusses: (1) the constitutional protections
afforded to bloggers and the various legal standards that courts apply to deter-
mine whether a blogger's identity should be revealed, (2) whether an OSP has
standing to challenge the subpoena on behalf of the user and what notification
steps an OSP must take to notify the user of a subpoena, (3) what liability an
OSP has for third-party content posted on sites that it hosts, and (4) what re-
course, if any, a blogger has after being unmasked outside of breach of fiduciary
duty allegations.
A. Bloggers' Expectation ofPrivacy and How to Unmask the Anonymous
Blogger
1. Constitutional Protection for Anonymous Speech
Anonymous commentary has played an important role in society, and is
often credited with identifying solutions for political, social, and cultural chal-
lenges as well as promoting unconventional ideas.15 Anonymous pamphleteer-
ing has long been considered part of the nation's "honorable tradition of advo-
cacy and of dissent."' 6 In fact, numerous anonymous texts, including the Fede-
ralist Papers, are believed to have decisively influenced "the progress of man-
kind."17
"The United States Supreme Court has long held that the First Amend-
ment protects an author's right to remain anonymous."18 For example, in Talley
v. California, the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous
leafleting.'9 The Court reasoned that "identification and fear of reprisal might
deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance." 20 The
Court continued to explain that "persecuted groups and sects from time to time
15 Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, in 2
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGTAL AGE 2009, 711 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2009) [herei-
nafter Protections].
16 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Conm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
17 Protections, supra note 15, at 770 (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)).
Is Shaun B. Spencer, Cyberslapp Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity and
Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 1. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 493, 496 (2001).
19 Talley, 362 U.S. at 66.
20 Id. at 65.
1004 [Vol. 113
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/10
A BLOGGER, GOOGLE, AND A "SKANK"
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws ei-
ther anonymously or not at all."21
Furthermore, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court
struck down a state law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature.22 The Court reasoned that an author's decision to remain anonymous
is an important aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
23
ment. The Court stated: "Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering
is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy
and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority." 2 4
This right to speak anonymously has been extended into cyberspace by
many courts in the past fifteen years.25 For example, in American Civil Liber-
ties Union v. Miller, a federal district judge struck down a Georgia statute pro-
hibiting the transmission of data on the Internet "if such data uses any individual
name . . . to falsely identify the person."26 The court reasoned that a speaker's
identity is part of the content of the speech and that this statute would have a
chilling effect on "the many Internet users who use pseudonyms online."27 The
court rejected the state's argument that the statute only applies to individuals
sending data with fraudulent intent, noting that preventing fraud was a compel-
ling government interest, but the statue was not narrowly tailored as it applied to
both fraudulent and non-fraudulent speech.2 8
Although online or offline anonymous speech is provided with some
First Amendment protection, this right is not absolute.2 9 As one commentator
explained, anonymous speech is better termed a "qualified privilege" because it
"must be balanced against the plaintiffs' interests."30  The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has not yet provided any guidance for the proper calcu-
lus for determining when an anonymous speaker's identity must be revealed.'
As a result, state and federal courts have developed a range of standards that
21 Id. at 64.
22 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
23 Id
24 Id. at 357.
25 Spencer, supra note 18, at 497; Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870
(1997) ("[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to [the internet].").
26 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
27 Spencer, supra note 18, at 497.
28 Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1232.
29 Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118
YALE L.J. 320, 327 (2008).
30 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1537, 1599-1600 (2007).
31 Protections, supra note 15, at 720.
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plaintiffs must satisfy in order to obtain the information needed to reveal a
speaker's identity.3 2
2. The Process to Unmask an Anonymous Blogger
It is instructive to understand the process leading to a court's determina-
tion of the question whether to reveal the anonymous Internet user's identity.
First, when a plaintiff feels that an online posting by an anonymous author has
defamed him or her, the plaintiff may file a "John Doe" action.3 3 John Doe is
"an entirely fictional character," on whose behalf plaintiffs could bring suits. 34
This technique is used to enable the initiation of proceedings against an un-
known defendant,35 which then allows the plaintiff to rely upon "court-
sanctioned discovery tools to identity" the unknown defendants.
Once the action has been filed, the plaintiff can pursue either the is-
suance of a third-party subpoena or any other available discovery device to the
OSP that knows the identity of the defendant.37 At this point, the anonymous
blogger can fight the order through his or her attorney while remaining ano-
nymous. When the subpoena is challenged, the court then must balance the
competing interest of the author's First Amendment right to remain anonymous
and the plaintiffs right to seek redress for injuries. 3 9 As one court explained,
courts must choose a "standard such that aggrieved parties can obtain remedies,
but cannot demand the court system unmask every insolent, disagreeable, or
fiery anonymous online figure."40
3. Applicable Legal Standards to Evaluate Whether to Unmask a
Blogger
Three main approaches have developed to evaluate whether anonymous
Internet bloggers' identities should be revealed.4 1 These three standards are
known as: "The Motion to Dismiss Standard,"42 "The Summary Judgment
32 Id.
3 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12:24.60 (2d ed. Database updated 2009).
34 Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John
Doe Parties, 57 U. PIr. L. REv. 883, 890 (1996).
35 Gleicher, supra note 18, at 327.
36 Id
3 SMOLLA, supra note 33.
3 Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking "Anonl2345 ": Applying an Appropriate Standard when
Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous Internet Defamation Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 947, 954 (2009).
3 Protections, supra note 15, at 718.
4 McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (D. Mass. 2006).
41 Lewis, supra note 38, at 954-57.
42 See Dendrite Int'l., Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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Standard,A 3 and "The Good Faith Basis Standard."" Each of these tests places
a different level of burden on the plaintiff to present facts sufficient to unmask
the anonymous author.
a. The Motion to Dismiss Standard&5
The "Motion to Dismiss Standard" was first introduced by a New Jersey
Appellate Court in Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe.46 Dendrite, a corpora-
tion, brought a defamation action against John Doe defendants for posting
comments on a Yahoo! Bulletin board.4 7 The comments were critical of Den-
drite's direction and changes to its revenue recognition accounting. 48 Dendrite
initiated a suit against Doe and then filed a motion seeking the OSP to show
cause as to why Doe's identity should not be revealed.49 In denying its motion,
the Dendrite court announced a four-step process for trial courts to follow when
determining whether to compel an OSP to disclose the identity of an anonymous
Internet poster:
(1) require the plaintiff to notify defendants that they are the
subject of a subpoena and withhold action until they have a rea-
sonable amount of time to respond;
(2) require the plaintiff to identify the exact defamatory state-
ments;
(3) require the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint a prima fa-
cie cause of action that can survive a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim, as well as evidence supporting each element
of the cause of action; and
43 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005).
4 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev'd on other ground sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
Traded Co., 542 S.E. 2d 377 (Va. 2001).
45 This is also known as the "Prima Facie Standard." See Protections, supra note 15, at 723.
However, different courts have used this language to mean different things. Legal Protections for
Anonymous Speech, CmZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/legal-
protections-anonymous-speech (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) [hereinafter CMLP]; see, e.g., Sony
Music Entm't v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (only requiring some evi-
dence); Pub. Relations Soc'y of Am. v. Road Runner High Speed Online, 799 N.Y.S.2d 847 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2005) (applying the motion to dismiss standard); Alvis Coatings v. John Does 1-40, No.
3L94 CV 374-H, 2004 WL 2904405 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2004) (relying on the evidence).
4 Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 763.
49 Id
10072011]
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(4) balance the defendant's First Amendment rights against the
strength of the plaintiffs case.50
What this means, under Dendrite, the defamed plaintiff not only has the
burden of setting forth his case to a degree which will withstand a motion to
dismiss, but also must give notice to the defendants that they are subject to a
subpoena, prior to a court unmasking an anonymous blogger. Following the
Dendrite decision, this test has been followed in a number of jurisdictions.' In
fact, one commentator noted "it appears that the groundswell is moving slightly
... in the direction of the [motion to dismiss] test announced by the Dendrite
court."5 2 This test is identified as being the most protective of anonymous
speech because of the court's balancing of the defendant's First Amendment
rights against the strengths of the plaintiffs case.53
b. The Summary Judgment Standard
The "Summary Judgment Standard" was first announced by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill.5 4 In Cahill, Councilman Patrick Cahill
filed a defamation suit against four anonymous defendants for comments made
on an Internet blog regarding his performance as councilman in Smyrna, Dela-
ware.55 For example, one comment stated, "Anyone who has spent any amount
of time with Cahill would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to men-
tion an obvious mental deterioration."56 The trial court ordered the OSP to dis-
close the identity of the anonymous defendant and one of the anonymous Does
appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court.
Following an examination of the "Motion to Dismiss Standard," the
court expressed concern that setting a low standard for plaintiffs to meet would
have a chilling effect on anonymous posting, thus violating potential posters
from exercising their constitutional right to speak anonymously. 8 As a result,
the court modified the "Motion to Dismiss Standard" and settled on a two-part
test.5 9 The plaintiff must first "to the extent reasonably practicable under the
so Lewis, supra note 38, at 955 (citing Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760).
5' See e.g., Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); High-
fields Capital Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974-76 (N.D. Cal. 2005); In re Baxter, No. 01-
00026-M, 2001 WL 34806203, at *12 (W.D. La. Dec. 20, 2001); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d
712, 718-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
52 Protections, supra note 15, at 722.
s3 CMLP, supra note 45.
54 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454.
5 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 455.
58 Id. at 459.
SId. at 460-61.
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circumstance ... undertake efforts to notify the anonymous poster that he is the
subject of a subpoena or application for order of disclosure."60 The court also
required that the plaintiff "post a message notifying the anonymous defendant of
the plaintiffs discovery request on the same message board where the allegedly
defamatory statement was originally posted."6  After satisfying these notifica-
tion provisions, the plaintiff must then support his claim with sufficient facts to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.62
Although the court adopted two prongs of the Dendrite four-part "Mo-
tion to Dismiss Standard," it expressly rejected the other two prongs.63 In re-
jecting the second prong-requiring the plaintiff to set forth the exact defamato-
ry statements-the Delaware court noted that this would be "subsumed in the
summary judgment inquiry."6 In rejecting Dendrite's fourth requirement-that
the trial court balance the defendant's First Amendment rights-the Delaware
65
court also concluded that this is subsumed in the summary judgment inquiry.
The Court commented that the balancing called for in the fourth prong would
add no other protection "above and beyond that of the summary judgment test
and needlessly complicates the analysis."66 This standard also has been widely
accepted among various courts.6 7 This is considered a high-burden 6 8 test for the
plaintiff to meet because the plaintiff must "bring forward a substantial amount
of evidence to support the underlying legal claim."6 9
c. The Good Faith Basis Standard
Prior to Dendrite and Cahill, the Virginia Circuit Court, in In re Sub-
poena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc., established the "Good Faith Ba-
sis Standard." 70 This standard, however, "has not gained much traction in other
courts."7 In that case, a Virginia court was asked to decide whether an OSP,
6 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
61 Id. at 461.
62 Id. at 460.
63 Id
6 Id. at 461.
65 Id
6 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
67 See, e.g., Best Western Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-0601537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695,
at *4 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006); Reunion Industry, Inc. v. Doe 1, 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 456 (Ct.
Com. Pl. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 245-46 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2008).
68 CMLP, supra note 45.
69 CMLP, supra note 45.
70 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000).
n Lewis, supra note 38, at 956; "The Delaware Supreme Court overturned the superior court's
decision adopting the good faith standard and holding that Doe's identity should be revealed."
Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455.
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America Online ("AOL"), should reveal the identity of five John Does that alle-
gedly made defamatory statements in an AOL chat room.7 2 The plaintiff served
AOL with a discovery subpoena, and AOL sought to quash the subpoena on
First Amendment grounds.7 3 The court ordered the unmasking of the anonym-
ous defendants because the subpoena "does not unduly burden the First
Amendment rights of the John Does."
In ordering the unmasking, the court announced and applied a three-part
test that plaintiffs must satisfy before the court will order OSP to reveal the
identity of an anonymous defendant. The test is satisfied when: (1) the court
is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence presented; (2) that "the party requesting
the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the
victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was filed;" 7 6 and (3)
the defendant's identity is necessary for the plaintiff to advance the claim.77
One commentator noted that the language of this test allows for un-
masking of an anonymous blogger without the plaintiff bringing forward evi-
dence to support each element of his underlying claim. As a result, this test is
generally considered to be a low-burden test.7 9
d. Other Factors Considered By Courts
Although these three standards represent what a number of courts apply,
they are not the only standards used.o Over the past decade, courts have
adopted at least seven different standards to evaluate John Doe subpoenas.81
These various tests share several common factors, including:
(1) ensuring the defendant has notice and opportunity to re-
spond to the subpoena before his identity is exposed,
(2) evaluating the strength of the plaintiffs case,
(3) determining the relevance of the information sought by sub-
poena to the plaintiffs claim,
72 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *1.
73 Id
74 Id. at *8.
75 Id
76 Id.
n Id. at *8.
78 CMLP, supra note 45.
7 Id. A low-burden test generally allows for the unmasking of an anonymous blogger without
the plaintiff bringing forward evidence to support each element of his underlying legal claim. Id
so See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 718-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
8! Gleicher, supra note 29, at 337.
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(4) balancing the interests of the plaintiff and defendant,
(5) requiring that the plaintiff make his claim and demonstrate
his evidence with specificity, and
(6) requiring that the plaintiff exhaust all alternatives for identi-
fying the plaintiff before turning to a John Doe subpoena.82
Courts developed the first four factors between 1999 and 2001.8 These
early factors "describe a pattern of experimentation by courts centering around
fairly weak protection for the anonymity of online speakers."" The next three
factors, all developed after 2001, demand a stronger showing by the plaintiff,
thus suggesting a greater recognition by courts of the unusual constitutional
challenges posed by John Doe subpoenas." This is consistent with the recent
and growing trend in anonymity cases for courts to apply a high-burden test. 86
B. OSPs' Obligations to Anonymous Bloggers
Next, it is important to examine what obligations, if any, an OSP has to
its users. Generally, this section discusses whether an OSP has standing to op-
pose a subpoena on the grounds of the blogger's First Amendment rights and
what type notification an OSP must provide to the blogger who is the subject of
the subpoena.
1. Standing to Challenge Subpoenas
Although there is currently little case law regarding whether an OSP has
standing to challenge John Doe subpoenas, the majority of courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have concluded that OSPs and other website hosts may assert
the rights of their anonymous posters under the principle ofjus tertii standing.
Jus tertii standing is generally defined as "the right of a third party."
Powers v. Ohio is the leading case examining this principle. In Powers,
the United States Supreme Court announced a three-prong test to determine
when someone may assert the rights of a third party.89 This test requires that the
challenger establish that (1) the litigant suffered an injury in fact, (2) the litigan-
82 Id.
83 Id. at 341.
8 Id.
85 Id.
86 CMLP, supra note 45.
87 Protections, supra note 15, at 719.
88 BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY 942 (9th ed. 2009).
89 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).
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thave a close relation to the third party, and (3) there is some hindrance to the
third party's ability to protect her own interest.90
What exactly is required is to establish a "close relationship" when
OSPs are involved, however, is still unclear. As one commentator noted,
"While some decisions appear to require that the recipient risk financial loss or
demonstrate a 'close relationship' with the speaker, others do not."91 For exam-
ple, in In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., the court found third-party standing
because the OSP could lose business if it were not allowed to assert the rights of
its subscribers. 92  Here, the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") sought the identity of anonymous users who they believed violated
copyright laws by offering hundreds of songs for free download over the Inter-
net.93 Verizon, on behalf of its users, sought to quash the subpoena, contending
that the First Amendment protected the users' identities.94 The court ultimately
denied the motion to quash.
But before addressing the merits of the motion to quash, the court eva-
luated whether Verizon had standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its
users.9 6 The court concluded that Verizon had standing, explaining that the rela-
tionship between Verizon and its subscribers is the type of relationship that will
ensure that issues will be presented concretely and sharply.97 The court also
found that Verizon has a "vested interest in vigorously protecting its subscrib-
ers' First Amendment rights, because a failure to do so could affect Verizon's
ability to maintain and broaden its client base."98 The court then went on to cite
cases where the United States Supreme Court has recognized third-party stand-
ing in "similar business/client relationships." 99
Another example of an OSP having standing on behalf of its users is in
Enterline v. Pocono Medical Center.'00 In that case, a federal district court al-
lowed a newspaper to assert the First Amendment rights of anonymous posters
to its website because it had a close relationship with its posters.10 Here, Bren-
9 Id.
91 Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John: Can the Media Protect
Anonymous Online Speech?, 26-JUL CoMM. L. 4, 5 (2009) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Shiel-
ding].
92 In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258 (D.D.C. 2003).
9 Id. at 246.
94 Id. Verizon also challenged the subpoena on the grounds that binding the users in absence
of a case or controversy violates the court's Article III powers. Id. at 246-47.
9s Id.
96 Id. at 257-58.
9 Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
98 Id.
Id.
'" No. 08-cv-1934, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008).
101 Id. at *3.
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da Enterline filed a lawsuit against the Pocono Medical Center alleging she was
subjected to sexual harassment and was retaliated against after complaining
about the harassment.10 2 The Pocono Record ("the Newspaper") published an
article about the lawsuit, and in response to the article, several people anony-
mously posted comments on the Newspaper's website claiming they had per-
sonal knowledge of the facts at issue in the case.103 Enterline served the News-
paper with a discovery subpoena seeking the identity of the anonymous post-
ers.' The Newspaper sought to quash this subpoena on behalf of the anonym-
ous posters.'0o The court found third-party standing for the Newspaper because
"the relationship between [the Newspaper] and readers posting in the Newspa-
per's online forums is the type of relationship that allows [the Newspaper] to
assert the First Amendment rights of the anonymous commentators." 0  Based
upon the limited case law, it appears that OSPs do have standing to challenge a
subpoena based upon the user's First Amendment rights. Because OSPs have
standing to challenge a subpoena on behalf of a third-party, the question be-
comes what duty does that OSP have to challenge a subpoena on behalf of a
third-party?"0 "
2. OSPs' Duty to Provide Notice of a Subpoena to Its Users
Generally, the plaintiff has the duty to undertake efforts to notify the
anonymous author about the subpoena and provide him or her with time to re-
spond. 0 8 This notification can take an untraditional form. For example, in Mo-
bilisa, Inc. v. Doe, the court ordered the requesting party to "notify the anonym-
ous party via the same medium used by the party to send or post" the alleged
defamatory statement.' 09 The court gave the example that if the message was
sent via email, "the requesting party must make the notification via a response
to the email or separate email to the anonymous sender's address. Similarly, if
the message at issue was posted to an Internet message board, the requesting
party must take the notification via a posting to that same message board.""o
Although many courts impose this duty upon the plaintiff, some courts
have held that the recipient of the subpoena, in this case the OSP, may also be
102 Id at*1.
103 Id
'0 Id.
10 Enterline, 2008 WL 5192386, at *3.
107 See discussion infra Section III.
108 Protections, supra note 15, at 732.
1" 170 P.3d 712, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
1o Id. at 719-20.
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obligated to provide notice to the anonymous poster."' For example, in UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Does 1-4, the court ordered the subpoenaed company to give
its subscribers a copy of the subpoena prior to releasing any personally identifi-
able information five days upon its receipt of the subpoena.1 2 The court rea-
soned that this notice was required in "the interest of fairness and pursuant to
[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) and (iv), which provide that
a subpoena may be quashed or modified if it requires disclosure of privileged or
'other protected matter,' or if it subjects a person to undue burden."" The
court concluded that because of the privacy and First Amendment interests at
stake, it had authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to condition
the subpoena on notice and an opportunity to be heard by the anonymous post-
er. 114
Similarly, in Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, the trial court also ordered the OSP
to notify the anonymous poster of the pending proceedings when the plaintiff
attempted, but failed, to contact the poster."5 The OSP appealed this deci-
sion.116 In upholding the trial court's ruling, the appellate court reasoned that
the trial court was within its inherent authority to place the burden on the OSP to
notify the anonymous poster." 7 The court did, however, note that if the OSP
incurred costs in notifying the anonymous poster, the trial court could require
the requesting party to pay that cost."8
The court in Solers, Inc. v. Doell9 also took a similar approach. In that
case, an anonymous person filed an online complaint to the Software & Infor-
mation Industry Association ("SIIA") claiming that Solers was using unlicensed
software.120 The SIIA investigated the report, but closed the file without taking
any further action.121 After the file was closed, Solers then filed a complaint
against the anonymous person, claiming defamation and tortious interference
with "advantageous business opportunities." 2 2  Solers issued a subpoena to
III See, e.g., Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328, 342 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2004);
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does 1-4, No. 06-
0652 SBA (EMC), 2006 WL 1343597, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2006).
112 2006 WL 1343597, at *3.
113 Id.
114 id
" 170 P.3d at 721.
116 Id.
117 Id
118 Id.
119 977 A.2d 941, 945 (D.C. 2009).
120 Id.
121 Id. SIIA claims it closed its file not because the allegations were false, but because it
wanted to protect the identity of the anonymous reporter. Id.
122 Id. at 946.
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SIIA, and SIIA moved to quash. 12 3 SIIA, on its own initiative, notified John
Doe of the subpoena. 124
Nonetheless, in reviewing the trial court's decision to quash the subpoe-
na, the appellate court discussed who is required to notify John Doe of the sub-
poena.125 The court acknowledged that many jurisdictions require the plaintiff
to notify the defendant, usually by the same manner in which the defamatory
remark was posted.12 6 The court explained, however, that "[n]evertheless, it
often will be simpler and more effective to require the recipient of the subpoena
(who likely knows the identity of the anonymous defendant, or at least knows
how to contact him) to provide such notice."'12 7  Instead of a blanket require-
ment that the recipient must notify John Doe of the subpoena, the court left it up
to the trial court "to determine in the circumstances of each case who should
notify the anonymous defendant ....
Although the majority of the notification requirements are being created
judicially, at least one state has codified certain notification requirements in
civil cases regarding subpoenas to identify anonymous posters.12 9 This Virginia
statute requires the person seeking identification of the anonymous poster, inter
alia, to show "[t]hat other reasonable efforts to identify the anonymous commu-
nicator have proven fruitless."130 The statute then requires the recipient of the
subpoena to notify the subject of the subpoena via e-mail and to forward a copy
of the subpoena through certified mail or a commercial delivery service.' 3'
In addition to the Virginia statute, a federal law exists requiring that ca-
ble operators must notify a subscriber before disclosing personally identifiable
information in response to a court order.132 In the context of this statute, a cable
operator includes an OSP using cable modems.133
C. OSP Liability to a Defamed Plaintiff
In addition to constitutional concerns and an OSP's general obligations
to users, it is also important to discuss any potential liability an OSP may have
to defamed plaintiffs. Traditionally, the defamation plaintiff can sue both the
123 Id.
124 Id. at 946, 955.
125 Solers, 977 A.2d at 954.
126 Id
127 Id.
128 Id. at 955.
129 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2002).
130 Id. at § 401.1(A)(1)(b).
131 Id. at § 401.1(A)(3).
132 47 U.S.C. § 55 1(c) (2006).
133 Protections, supra note 15, at 725, n.73.
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author and the primary publishers 3 4 of the libelous statement.'3 5 When state-
ments are made through the Internet or on a person's blog, the OSP would po-
tentially be considered the publisher. 3 6
Congress, however, through the Communications Decency Act of
1996'" ("CDA"), has closed off this potential avenue of recovery for plain-
tiffs.' 38 Section 230 of the CDA provides that no OSP "shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another."' 39 This means
that Internet service providers, website operators, and forum moderators are not
publishers for the purposes of defamation actions.14 0 Despite this statutory proc-
lamation, in some jurisdictions, an OSP may still be held liable to a defamed
plaintiff as a minority of courts have held that an OSP may be liable when the
'41OSP is the "distributor," as opposed to the "publisher," of third-party content.
Traditionally, the distributor of third-party material can be subject to
civil liability if the distributor had knowledge or reason to know that the content
of the material was defamatory.142 Despite this traditional understanding, a ma-
jority of courts have held that the CDA extends immunity to OSPs as distribu-
tors.143 For example, in Zeran v. America Online, an unidentified person posted
a message on an AOL bulletin board selling shirts "featuring offensive and
tasteless slogans related" to the Oklahoma City bombing.'" The message di-
rected those interested to call "Ken" at Zeran's home number.14 5 As a result of
this prank, Zeran received a high volume of calls, mainly consisting of angry
and derogatory messages, including some death threats.146  Zeran contacted
AOL to remove the message and a representative assured him that the message
would be removed. AOL, however, would not print a retraction as it is against
the corporation's policy.14 7
134 A plaintiff can also seek to sue the distributor of a defamatory remark. However, a majority
of courts have interpreted the Communications Decency Act to apply broadly to distributors of
defamatory speech in the Internet context. See discussion infra Section § II.B.3 for further expla-
nation.
135 Lewis, supra note 38, at 952.
136 Id.
' 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
138 See Lewis, supra note 38, at 959.
13 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
140 See STUCKEY, supra note 14, at §2.03[2].
141 See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666 (7th Cir. 2008).
142 STUCKEY, supra note 14, at §2.03.
143 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
'" Id. at 329.
I45 Id.
14 Id.
147 Id.
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Zeran filed suit against AOL.14 8 AOL responded that the CDA granted
it immunity from the suit and filed a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.14 9 The
district court agreed. 50 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that AOL was immune
from liability.' After reviewing the purpose of the CDA, the court reasoned
that "Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages." 52 As a result,
the court concluded that distributor liability "is merely a subset, or a species, of
publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed" by the CDA.s 3
Similarly, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the publisher immunity exception
of the CDA was expanded to include OSP immunity from suit even when the
defamatory content is licensed for use by the OSP.15 4 Here, the Drudge Report,
an online Internet gossip column, 5 posted a story alleging that Sid Blumenthal,
an incoming assistant to the President, had a history of domestic violence.'15 6
The next day, the story was retracted and the Drudge Report issued a public
apology.157 The Blumenthals, however, sued Drudge and AOL, the OSP for
Drudge and one of its business partners. 58 Although the district court conceded
that AOL would certainly be considered a distributor under common law,' 59 the
court ultimately concluded that the CDA prohibits liability for an OSP. 60 The
court explained that "[i]n some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the
service provider community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liabili-
ty as an incentive to [OSPs] to self-police the Internet for ... offensive material,
even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted."' 6 '
Next, in Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expanded OSP immunity to an
148 Id.
149 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
Iso Id. at 330.
151 Id. at 335.
152 Id. at 330-31.
153 Id. at 332.
' See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
155 Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the Blogosphere: New Solutions
for an Old Problem, 44 DuQ. L. REv. 607, 627 (2006).
156 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 46.
157 Id. at 48.
158 Id. at 46.
'9 Id. at 51 ("It would seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a pub-
lisher or, at least, like a book store owner or library, to the liability standards applied to a distribu-
tor.").
'60 Id. at 52.
161 Id
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OSP that took an active part in the developing of the false statements. 162 Here,
AOL provided stock quotation information that was continuously updated
throughout the day.'6 ' Two independent third parties provided the information
to AOL; however, AOL would sometimes delete or edit that information.' "
The Plaintiffs argued that this editing rendered AOL both an interactive com-
puter service and an information content provider.16 5
The Tenth Circuit disagreed and held that "Plaintiff has not demonstrat-
ed [AOL] worked so closely with ComStock and Townsend regarding the alle-
gedly inaccurate stock information that [AOL] became an information content
provider."1 66 The court reasoned that "[b]y deleting symbols, however, [AOL]
simply made the data unavailable and did not develop or create the stock quota-
tion information displayed."' 67 Although the CDA defines an information con-
tent provider as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of information," the court found that AOL was not
such a provider. 168
The majority of courts have followed the Zeran-Blumenthal-Ben Ezra
line of cases finding the OSP immune from defamation actions because they fall
within the publisher exception of the CDA; however, a minority of courts have
not. For example, in Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., a public interest consortium brought suit against Craigs-
list for allegedly violating the Fair Housing Act by posting notices that adver-
tised housing by indicating preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, religion, sex, or family status.16 9 The district court granted Craigslist's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.7 0 Although an appellate court affirmed
the dismissal, it rejected that the CDA provides broad immunity, concluding that
the CDA is not a "general prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and
other online content hosts."' 7' The court reasoned that the United States Su-
preme Court's opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, holding
that "'information content providers' may be liable for contributory infringe-
ment if their system is designed to help people steal music or other material in
162 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000); Trende, supra note 155, at 628.
163 Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983.
' Id. at 985-86.
t65 Id. at 985.
166 Id.
167 Id
168 Trende, supra note 155, at 628-29 (formatting omitted).
169 Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
170 Id. at 666.
1' Id.
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copyright,"1 7 2 is "incompatible with treating § 230(c)(1) as a grant of compre-
hensive immunity from civil liability for content provided by a third party."1 73
Similarly, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando v. Room-
mates.com, LLC., a local fair housing council brought an action against Room-
mates.com for violating the Fair Housing Act.174 Before subscribers on Room-
mates.com can search listings or post housing opportunities, "they must create
profiles, a process that requires them to answer a series of questions."' 75 The
housing council alleges that the website is effectively acting as a "housing bro-
ker doing online what it may not lawfully do off-line."l 76 The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the CDA
bars this claim.177
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that
the CDA did not provide immunity to the website because "[t]he CDA does not
grant immunity for inducing third parties to express illegal preferences. Room-
mate's own acts-posting the questionnaire and requiring answers to it-are
entirely its doing and thus section 230 of the CDA does not apply to them."' 78
As a result, the court concluded that Roommates.com is a developer "[a]nd sec-
tion 230 provides immunity only if the interactive computer service does not
'creat[e] or develop[ ]' the information 'in whole or in part.""1
7 9
When dealing with CDA immunity issues, the court, however, was cog-
nizant of the fact that "there will always be close cases . . . .,,1so The court li-
mited its holding to cases "[w]here it is very clear that the website directly parti-
cipates in developing the alleged illegality . "... . 1s' For example, the court ex-
plained that websites involving "generic text prompt with no direct encourage-
ment to perform illegal searches or to publish illegal content" will still be im-
mune.18 2 The court summed up its holding: "If you don't encourage illegal
content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will
be immune.""'
Many commentators believe that the majority position of OSP immunity
from defamation actions under the publisher exception to the CDA is an incor-
172 Id. at 670 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005)).
173 Id.
174 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
17s Id. at 1161.
176 Id. at 1162.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1165.
1' Id. at 1166 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
180 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.
181 Id
182 Id. at 1175.
183 Id
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rect interpretation of the CDA.'8 George Washington University Law Profes-
sor, Daniel Solove, a leading commentator on the Internet and privacy, believes
the CDA should be read to grant immunity only until the OSP is informed of
defamatory speech on its Website.' 85 Once the OSP is informed of the poten-
tially problematic speech, if the OSP does nothing about the speech, that act
would constitute an implicit endorsement of the comment for which the OSP
could be held liable.'16 Similarly, another commentator, Cara Ottenweller, be-
lieves Congress should amend the CDA to emphasize protection from publisher
liability only, which would "put an end to the dangerous blanket immunity that
recent judicial interpretation has unwisely crafted."' 87  Furthermore, any
amendment would also include an explicit provision that an OSP would not be
immune from distributor liability if the OSP has notice of the objectionable ma-
terials and fails to take remedial action.'88
While the majority of courts hold an OSP immune from defamation ac-
tions because they fall within the publisher exception of the CDA, a minority of
courts, and a number of commentators believe the CDA does not provide for the
broad immunity called for by the majority. As it stands now, however, the Ze-
ran-Blumenthal-Ben Ezra line of cases stands as the majority position.
D. Anonymous Poster's Recourse Against "Defamed" Plaintiff Anti-
SLAPP Laws
Recall that the right to speak anonymously has been extended by many
courts into cyberspace. However, like most rights, this is not absolute. Three
main tests have emerged with respect to unmasking an anonymous blogger:
"The Motion to Dismiss Standard," "The Summary Judgment Standard," and
"The Good Faith Basis Standard." With this growing body of law allowing for
the discovery of an anonymous poster's identity, many are concerned that some
plaintiffs, specifically companies, will use discovery subpoenas as "weapons"
against people who speak out on the Internet. 8 9 As a result, the term "cyber-
SLAPP" has emerged.
A "cyberSLAPP" is an attempt to "silence .. . anonymous critics on the
[chat] boards and intimidate other Internet users to keep their criticisms to them-
'8 See Lewis, supra note 38, at 960.
185 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 154 (Yale Univ. Press 2007).
186 Id.
187 Cara J. Ottenwellar, Note, Cyberbullying: The Interactive Playground Cries for a Clarifica-
tion ofthe Communications Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1285, 1329 (2007).
188 Id
189 Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment Interests,
Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age ofBlogs and Social Networking Sites, 8 FIRST AMEND.
L. REv. 176, 204 (2009).
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selves." 90 At least twenty-nine states, however, have dealt with the issue of
"cyberSLAPPs" by either statute or through case law.191 These states allow the
victim of the "cyberSLAPPs" to "defend the lawsuit under their state's anti-
SLAPP law."' 92 Anti-SLAPP laws are "typically designed to bring about a
quick disposition of the case believed to be a SLAPP, immunize the comments
of the citizens who have spoken out and allow for attorneys fees and costs if the
court determines that the lawsuit was filed for a nefarious purpose."' 93 Most
importantly though, "these laws often require that discovery [of the anonymous
poster] be stayed while the court considers [whether] to strike the lawsuit."' 94
When the blogger's anonymity is removed, the exposure of the blog-
ger's identity can result in intimidation, harassment, and possible "retaliation by
either the instigator of the lawsuit or the speaker's peers."' 95 Because of these
potential negative results of having the identity revealed, removal of a blogger's
anonymity will result in chilling speech.19 6 In order to balance the right of a
plaintiff to recover from allegedly defamatory remarks and the right of defen-
dants from being subject to SLAPP suits, most anti-SLAPP laws require the
plaintiff to make "an evidentiary showing to avoid dismissal."197 For example,
California's anti-SLAPP statue requires a showing that there is a "probability
that he or she will prevail on the claim."' 98 Therefore, much like all other as-
pects of anonymous blogging and defamation, when a court is faced with a po-
tential SLAPP suit, the court must balance the constitutional rights of the ano-
nymous blogger with the rights of the plaintiff to seek recovery for defamatory
remarks.
III. ANALYSIS: DOES AN OSP OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO ITS USERS?
Recall in the "Skanks in NYC" case that Google, as a matter of policy,
would not reveal the identity of its user without a court order and that court or-
der was later granted.199 What did Google do then to prevent the issuance of the
court order? Google objected to the subpoena, but it "merely object[ed] that
190 California Anti-SLAPP Project, CyberSLAPPS: Company Lawsuits Against Anonymous
Internet Posters, http://www.casp.net/slapps/cyberslapp.html (last visited February 28, 2011).
191 Richards, supra note 189, at 205.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id
' L.J. KuTrEN, 4 COMPUTER SorrwARE PROTECTION-LIABILITY-LAw-FORMS DATABASE Ano-
nymity § 18:34 (2010).
196 Id.
19 Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSlapp Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity and
Accountability in Cyberspace, 19. J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 501 (2001).
' CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3) (West 2011).
199 See Davis, supra note 6.
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petitioner's request for relief [was] overbroad, vague and ambiguously worded,
and unduly burdensome." 200 Google did not aggressively challenge the subpoe-
na outside of this formulaic motion.2 0 1 Because Google did not aggressively
challenge the subpoena, the anonymous blogger discussed bringing suit against
Google alleging a breach of fiduciary duty.202
This analysis section discusses the arguments for and against a finding
that an OSP has a fiduciary duty to its users. First, this section will provide an
update on the cases where the plaintiff has sought to unmask an anonymous
blogger. This section will then examine when a fiduciary duty exists. Next, this
section considers whether an OSP can be considered a fiduciary as well as ad-
dressing the counter arguments to considering an OSP as a fiduciary. Finally,
this section concludes with two recommendations on how OSPs can avoid the
formation of a fiduciary relationship.
A. Other Cases Seeking to Unmask an Anonymous Blogger
In October 2010, Google again was ordered to turn over the identity and
contact information of an anonymous commenter.20 3 Carla Franklin, a business
consultant, sued Google over a video and comments posted on YouTube.20 The
video contained personal information, while the comments contained sexual
slurs. 205 After filing suit, Google was ordered to provide the contact information
of those posting the denigrating comments and videos.206 Moreover, in July of
2010, a North Carolina trial court judge ordered the editor of a local community
blog to turn over the identities of six anonymous commentators who allegedly
defamed a local politician.2 07 Applying essentially the "Motion to Dismiss
Standard," the Court found that six out of the twenty anonymous comments
were actionable, thus ordering the OSP to turn over their identities. 208 As these
two cases illustrate, as blogging and other Internet commentary become preva-
lent, courts will be forced to address the tension between protecting the constitu-
200 Order granting Cohen petition to compel disclosure, at I n. 1, Cohen v. Google, Inc., No.
100012/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.cyberslapp.org/documents/OrderGrantCohenPet.pdf.
201 See id.
202 See discussion supra Section I.
203 Jennifer Peltz, Carla Franklin Wins: Google Must Reveal Identity of Online Harasser,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2010/10/21/carla-franklin-
lawsuit-go-n771063.html.
204 Id
205 Id
206 Id
207 Marina Petrova, N.C. Judge Unmasks Pseudonymous Blog Commenters, CmZEN MEDIA
LAW PROJECT (July 9, 2010), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/nc-judge-unmasks-
pseudonymous-blog-commenters.
208 See id
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tional right to blog anonymously with an allegedly defamed person's interest in
proceeding with his or her case.
B. When Does a Fiduciary Duty Exist?
"Fiduciary law is messy. . . . [T]he prevailing view remains that fidu-
ciary law is 'elusive."' 2 09 Many relationships are treated as fiduciary simply
because it is a function of the relationship rather than the quality of the particu-
lar relationship. 210  These types of relationships typically include "attorney-
client, corporate director-shareholders, trustee-beneficiary, managing partner-
partner, agent-principal, employee-employer, guardian-ward, and physician-
patient." 2 1' There are, however, "a few relatively uncontroversial propositions
about the concept upon which almost all could agree." 2 12 The uncontroversial
factors that courts use to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists in-
clude: relationships of trust, expertise in the interaction at issue, greater control
over assets, and a high degree of influence over a beneficiary's decision-making
process.2 0
No courts have yet addressed whether a fiduciary relationship exists be-
tween an OSP and a user. At least one court, however, has found that a fidu-
ciary relationship exists when confidential information, among other things, is
exchanged between parties.214 In Anonymous v. CVS Corporation, a New York
trial court found a fiduciary relationship existed between a customer and a
pharmacist.215 Here, CVS Corporation purchased a local pharmacy and its pre-
scription records.2 16 Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with HIV and AIDS, brought
a suit against the local pharmacy and CVS claiming the local pharmacy
breached its fiduciary duty of confidentiality by sharing the prescription records
with CVS and that CVS aided and induced this breach.2 17 CVS and the local
pharmacy asserted that no fiduciary duty of confidentiality existed, and if it did,
209 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory ofFiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399,
1400 (2002).
210 Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 665, 671 (2009).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 682.
213 Id
214 Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (discussing Evans
v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1996), as well as Griffin v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 790 F. Supp.
1115 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (refusing to recognize a fiduciary relationship in a pharmacist/customer
relationship)).
215 Id
216 Id. at 335.
217 Id. at 335-36.
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they did not breach it when transferring the records to another pharmacist. 218
The court disagreed.2 19
In finding that a fiduciary duty existed between the pharmacy and plain-
tiff, the court first reasoned that a fiduciary duty exists "where one party reposed
trust and confidence in another who exercises discretionary functions for the
party's benefit or possesses superior expertise on which the party relied."2 20 The
court then determined that pharmacists, unlike parties to traditional commercial
transactions, are required to collect confidential medical information.22 1 Al-
though communicating confidential information alone is not enough to create a
fiduciary relationship, the court also found that customers relied on the phar-
macist for drug advice.22 2 In sum, because the pharmacist had a "superior
knowledge of pharmaceuticals," the customer placed a degree of trust and con-
fidence in the pharmacist's superior knowledge, and the customer gave his con-
fidential information to the pharmacist, a fiduciary relationship was created.223
Applying these principles, a discussion of the arguments for and against the
establishment of a fiduciary relationship between a user and an OSP follows.
C. Argument: An OSP Is a Fiduciary
1. CVS Corporation Analysis
Looking first at the analysis in CVS Corporation, in order to create the
fiduciary relationship between an OSP and a user, it would have to be shown
that the user reposes trust and confidence in the OSP, who, in return, exercises
discretionary functions for the user's benefit or the user relies on the OSP's su-
perior expertise.224 Blogger.com's Terms of Service provide that "Google
claims no ownership or control over any Content submitted, posted or displayed
by you on or through Google services."225 Furthermore, Blogger.com allows for
the user to setup the blog by choosing a template and customizing the blog's
design.22 6 Clearly, the setup is at the discretion of the user, but the analysis does
not stop there.
218 Id. at 336.
219 Id. at 337.
220 CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
221 Id
222 Id
223 Id at 338.
224 See discussion supra Section III.B.
225 Blogger Terms of Service, BLOGGER.COM, 6, http://www.blogger.com/terms.g (last visited
March 1, 2011) [hereinafter Blogger Terms].
226 Blogger Features, BLOGGER.COM, http://www.blogger.com/features (last visited March 1,
2011) [hereinafter Blogger Features].
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In setting up the blog, however, the user is relying on the superior ex-
pertise of the OSP. Creating a website from scratch can be very hard.227 Sites
like Blogger.com provide the user with predesigned templates, where the blog-
ger can easily change the fonts, text color, and alignment. 2 8 Essentially, these
sites allow you to "[c]reatfe] your blog ... [in] just a few easy steps. "29 Thus,
an argument can be made that users are relying on the superior expertise of the
OSP in order to create a blog.
Moreover, the user, by accessing this service, is reposing trust and con-
fidence in the site. As Google itself acknowledges, these sites "are keenly
aware of the trust . . . [the] users place in [the OSP]." 23 0 This is especially true
when it comes to privacy matters. For example, Google has established five
principles that outline their privacy objectives.2 3 1 Similarly, another prominent
blog site, Wordpress.com, has established four key principles of privacy.232 In
accordance with the privacy principles, both of these sites will not share person-
al information with anyone unless it must do so to comply with the law or to
develop their products, which includes sharing it with their subsidiaries.233
Thus, an argument can be made that the user has reposed trust and confidence in
the OSP by providing it with confidential identity information. Under the CVS
Corporation. analysis, because the user reposes trust and confidence in the OSP
and relies upon the superior expertise of the OSP in order to create a blog, a
fiduciary duty is created between the OSP and the user.
2. Principal/Agent Relationship
The other legal arena where a fiduciary duty could be created between
an OSP and a user is in terms of agency law. A principal/agent relationship is
created when "one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an
'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the prin-
227 Currently an online introduction to web design class takes eight weeks and costs $120.00.
See Web Design Course Online, HWG.ORG,
http://www.hwg.org/services/classes/webdesigncourse.html (last visited March 1, 2011). To get a
diploma in Web Design from The Art Institute takes 45 credits and would cost over $22,000. THE
ART INsTrruTE, http://www.artinstitutes.edu/Pittsburghladmissions/tuition-And-Fees.aspx (last
visited March 1, 2011).
228 Blogger Features, supra note 226.
229 Id.
230 Privacy FAQ, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/privacy/faq.html (last visited March 1,
2011) [hereinafter Google FAQ].
231 Privacy, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacy/ (last visited March 1, 2011)
[hereinafter Google Privacy].
232 Privacy Policy, AuToMATric.coM, http://automattic.comlprivacy/ (last visited March 1,
2011) [hereinafter Automattic Privacy].
233 Privacy Policy, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/privacy/privacy-policy.html (last
visited March 1, 2011) [hereinafter Google Privacy Policy]; see also Automattic Privacy, supra
note 232.
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cipal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act."234 In terms of the relationship between the user and the OSP, the user,
acting as the principal, chooses the OSP, or the agent, to host its webpage. 235
This agent can, however, "act independently to prevent the principal's
misconduct." 2 3 6 Although, Blogger.com believes "that censoring this content is
contrary to a service that bases itself on freedom of expression," 237 Blogger.com
created content boundaries to "both comply with legal requirements and that
serve to enhance the service as a whole."23 8 If the blog violates the content poli-
cy, Blogger.com will take a number of actions, including putting the blog behind
an interstitial where only the blog author can access the content or deleting the
blog.2 39
Assuming a principal/agent relationship is created, in order for fiduciary
duties to attach, there must be an element of confidentiality. The existence of a
principal/agent relationship alone does not give rise to a fiduciary relation-
ship.240 A fiduciary relationship between the principal and the agent will arise
when the principal relies upon the agent to protect the principal's confidential
information.24 1 This is especially true when the agent has particular know-
ledge.242 For example, "if an employee in the course of his employment ac-
quires secret information relating to his employer's business, he occupies a posi-
tion of trust and confidence toward it, and must govern his actions according-
ly.'243 An agent generally has a duty to protect the principal's confidential in-
formation.24
A blogger may be able to show that confidential information was pro-
vided to and protected by the OSP, which serves as the blogger's agent. Assum-
ing the blogger wishes to blog anonymously, the blogger's real name or any
way to identify the blogger (such as an IP address) becomes confidential. 2 4 5 Not
only is this confidential, but the right to blog anonymously is generally constitu-
234 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
235 See Assaf Hamdani, Note, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 922
(2002).
236 See id.
237 Blogger Content Policy, BLOGGER.CoM, http://www.blogger.com/content.g (last visited
March 1, 2011) [hereinafter Blogger Content].
238 Id
239 Id
240 Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. 13929, 1995 WL 409015, at *3 (Del.
Ch. July 5, 1995) (citing Maull v. Stokes, 68 A.2d 200, 202 (Del. Ch. 1949)).
241 Kaufman v. Guest Capital, L.L.C., 386 F. Supp. 2d 256, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
242 Metro Ambulance, 1995 WL 409015, at *3.
243 Triton Constr. Co. v. E. Shores Elec. Servs. Inc., No. 3290-VCP, 2009 WL 1387115, at *11
(Del Cb. May 18, 2009).
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
245 See, e.g., Automattic Privacy, supra note 232 ("We don't share your personal information
with anyone .... ).
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tionally protected. 24 When the user signs up for the website,247 the OSP volun-
tarily takes on the obligation to keep this information confidential. For exam-
ple, the Wordpress.com privacy page states that it doesn't "share your personal
information with anyone."24 8 Moreover, as discussed previously, these blog
sites take the privacy of their users very seriously.2 49 Thus, an argument can be
made that a fiduciary relationship between an OSP and user can arise under a
principal/agent relationship.
3. Breaching the Fiduciary Duty
Once a fiduciary relationship is established, it is possible that a breach
of that duty can be demonstrated if the fiduciary does not seek to quash a dis-
covery subpoena.2 50 For example, in Inghram v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Company, a district court in Missouri held that Mutual of Omaha breached its
fiduciary duty by not pursuing a motion to quash a discovery subpoena. 25 1 Here,
the plaintiff was set to be a "witness in an unrelated case entitled Walton v.
American Delivery Service."252 The defense attorney in the Walton case sub-
poenaed Inghram's medical records from Mutual of Omaha, Inghram's medical
insurance carrier.25 Mutual of Omaha mailed the medical records to the de-
fense attorney without obtaining consent by Inghram or challenging the subpoe-
na.2 54 Plaintiff then brought suit against Mutual of Omaha for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and breach of the physician-patient privilege.255
The court first found a fiduciary relationship between the insurance
company and the insured.256 After establishing this relationship the court noted
that Mutual of Omaha could have pursued several options to protect the confi-
dentiality of Inghram's medical records.2 57 These options include: filing objec-
tions with the defense attorney, filing a motion to quash, or seeking a protective
order before disclosing the records.2 58 The court found, because Mutual of
246 See discussion supra Section II.A. 1.
247 See, e.g., Google Privacy Policy, supra note 233 ("When you sign up . . . , we ask you for
personal information [such as your name].").
248 Automattic Privacy, supra note 232.
249 See discussion supra Section III.B.
250 See Inghram v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Mo. 2001).
251 Id. at 912.
252 Id. at 908.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 909.
256 Inghram, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
257 Id
258 Id.
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Omaha did not seek any of these options, nor did it seek consent from Inghram,
Mutual of Omaha breached its fiduciary duty.259
Although Inghram involved an insurance agency and an insured person,
an expansion of this principle to the realm of OSP and user would not be a far
stretch. Although the OSP is not the holder of medical information about the
user, the OSP is the holder of something that many would consider just as im-
portant-the anonymous user's identity. To put this into context, in Rosemary
Port's situation (the author of "Skanks in NYC"), assume the court found a fi-
duciary relationship, then under Inghram, Google would have been required to
aggressively challenge the subpoena in order to uphold the fiduciary relation-
ship.2 60 Instead, Google merely submitted a formulaic motion.2 61
D. Counter Arguments: An OSP Is Not a Fiduciary
Although an argument can be made that a fiduciary relationship exists
between an OSP and a user, an equally persuasive, if not stronger, argument can
be made that no such relationship exists. Looking first at the test set forth in
CVS Corporation, an OSP's superior expertise can be questioned. Although it
may be hard to create a complex website or blog, with a simple Google search, a
novice can find a multitude of instructions on how to create a website for free
and part with the services provided by an OSP. 2 62 Unlike a pharmacist, the ex-
pertise necessary to create a website or blog can be gained in a matter of days,
as opposed to a number of years.
In terms of arguing against a principal/agent relationship, this relation-
ship is formed when "one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another per-
son (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to
the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so
to act." 2 63 Here, the OSP, the proposed agent, is not subject to control of the
proposed principal, the user. Looking at the Blogger.com Terms of Service, it is
clear that Blogger.com is not subject to the control of the user.26 For example,
"Google disclaims all responsibility and liability for the availability, timeliness,
security or reliability of the Service." 26 5 Furthermore, the Terms of Service pro-
259 Id. at 912.
260 See id. at 911.
261 Order granting Cohen petition to compel disclosure at I n.1, Cohen v. Google Inc., No.
100012/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.cyberslapp.org/documents/OrderGrantCohenPet.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
262 This author did a Google search using "how to create a website from scratch for free." This
search netted numerous results, including a free "ebook" called How TO MAKE A WEBSITE FROM
SCRATCH (2001), available at http://download.cnet.com/How-to-Make-a-Website-From-
Scratch/3000-2124_4-10055643.html (last visited February 15, 2010).
263 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
264 See generally Blogger Terms, supra note 225.
265 Id
1028 [Vol. 113
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/10
A BLOGGER, GOOGLE, AND A "SKANK"
vide that "Google may, in its sole discretion, at any time and for any reason,
terminate the Service, terminate this Agreement, or suspend or terminate your
account." 26 6 Here, it appears the principal, who is the user, has no control over
the agent. Because there is no control over the agent by the principal, there is a
strong argument that a principal/agent relationship cannot be formed.
Because both CVS Corporation and the elements of a principal/agent re-
lationship require some sort of confidentiality or trust in order for a fiduciary
relationship to be formed, a single discussion of that element is sufficient. Al-
though it is true that blog sites generally protect the privacy of others, this pro-
tection is not absolute. For example, Google shares the user's personal informa-
tion with its "subsidiaries, affiliated companies or other trusted businesses or
persons for the purpose of processing personal information on our behalf."2 67
Similarly, Wordpress.com shares users' personal information with "contractors
and affiliated organizations." 2 68 These contractors and affiliated organizations
"may be located outside of your home country." 2 69 Thus, the blog site has not
truly kept personal information confidential from other third parties.
Furthermore, assuming a contract with the user is created by the terms
of service, such confidentiality agreements alone have been held to not create a
fiduciary relationship. 270 As one court noted, a fiduciary obligation is not "im-
posed simply because the parties to a contract reposed trust and confidence in
each other."2 71 Thus, although the OSP may contain a duty to generally keep
the user's identity confidential, this does not create a fiduciary duty.
E. How Can an OSP Avoid the Formation of a Fiduciary Relationship?
Although no court has found that a fiduciary relationship exists between
an OSP and a mere user of its site, it is not outside the realm of possibilities that
a court could find that such a relationship exists. As a result, an OSP may wish
to take some preemptive steps to avoid any conclusions that a fiduciary duty had
been created. First, OSPs should incorporate a statement in their terms of ser-
vice that plainly disclaims any fiduciary obligations. As an example, such a
statement may be: "The use of this website does not create any degree of trust
between the user and the OSP" or "The use of this website does not create a
fiduciary relationship between the user and this OSP." Although the finding of
fiduciary liability "is not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual
relation between the fiduciary and the beneficiary but results from the rela-
266 Id.
267 Google Privacy Policy, supra note 233.
268 Automattic Privacy, supra note 232.
269 Id.
270 See City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Channel Conunc'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1048 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
271 Id. at 1049.
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tion," 2 72 many courts are wary to create this relationship of higher trust in light
of specific contractual provisions to the contrary.273 Thus, adding an express
term disclaiming the existence of a fiduciary relationship would likely be treated
as at least relevant, if not dispositive, of the issue.
Second, the OSP should consider outlining the procedures it will follow
when it receives a subpoena seeking personal information of its user in its terms
and conditions. For example, Cyberslapp.org has outlined a seven-point "Sam-
ple Privacy Provision on 'Notice of Subpoenas' that an OSP should include in
its terms of service or privacy policy.2 74 The terms in this sample include provi-
sions limiting an OSP's obligations to simply notify the user of the subpoena,
informing the user that he or she may be able to challenge the subpoena on First
Amendment grounds, and further informing the user that he or she should seek
independent legal consultation.2 75 Although a provision outlining the limited
obligations of an OSP when it receives a subpoena may not preclude a finding
by the court of a fiduciary relationship, as discussed supra, generally courts do
not want to impose a higher relationship than that outlined in the parties' con-
276tractual agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The possibility of an OSP having a fiduciary relationship to its user is a
question that courts will likely have to face in the near future. Currently, online
anonymous speech is afforded constitutional protection. But, like most constitu-
tional protections, it has its limits. In order to determine those limits, courts
have developed a number of standards and factors to determine whether an ano-
nymous blogger should be unmasked. Although OSPs have limited duties, such
as notifying a user about a subpoena seeking her confidential information,
courts do allow OSPs standing to challenge subpoenas on the basis of the user's
First Amendment rights.
Although fiduciary law is messy, arguments for the formation of a fidu-
ciary relationship between users and OSPs can be made, primarily because the
user is reposing trust in the OSP and is also relying on the superior knowledge
of the OSP in the creation of their website. Furthermore, if an agency relation-
272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979).
273 Ne. Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Adver., Inc., 624 N.E.2d 129, 131 (N.Y. 1993) ("Probing our
precedents and equitable principles unearths no supportable justification for such a judicial inter-
position . . ."); see also Brinsights, LLC v. Charming Shoppes of Del., Inc., No. 06 Civ.
1745(CM), 2008 WL 216969, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Verilink Corp., 405 B.R. 356, 375
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009) ("Trustee has failed to cite any case in which an investment bank was
held to be a fiduciary in the face of express contractual disclaimers.").
274 CYBERSLAPP.ORG, http://www.cyberslapp.org/about/page.cfm?pageid=6 (last visited
March 3, 2011).
275 Id.
276 See discussion supra III.E.
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ship is established, because confidential information is passed on, that action
may create a fiduciary relationship between the agent and principal. However,
the argument that no fiduciary relationship exists is equally persuasive, primari-
ly because the confidential relationship communicated to the OSP is not kept
very confidential. Despite these arguments, an OSP can potentially avoid the
formation of a fiduciary relationship by including an express term disclaiming
the creation of such a relationship, as well as explicitly laying out the duties of
the OSP when it receives a subpoena seeking personal information.
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